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Abstract
Recent initiatives by regulatory agencies to increase spectrum resources available for broad-
band access include rules for sharing spectrum with high-priority incumbents. We study a model
in which wireless Service Providers (SPs) charge for access to their own exclusive-use (licensed)
band along with access to an additional shared band. The total, or delivered price in each band
is the announced price plus a congestion cost, which depends on the load, or total users normal-
ized by the bandwidth. The shared band is intermittently available with some probability, due
to incumbent activity, and when unavailable, any traffic carried on that band must be shifted
to licensed bands. The SPs then compete for quantity of users. We show that the value of
the shared band depends on the relative sizes of the SPs: large SPs with more bandwidth are
better able to absorb the variability caused by intermittency than smaller SPs. However, as the
amount of shared spectrum increases, the large SPs may not make use of it. In that scenario
shared spectrum creates more value than splitting it among the SPs for exclusive use. We also
show that fixing the average amount of available shared bandwidth, increasing the reliability of
the band is preferable to increasing the bandwidth.
1 Introduction
The evolution of wireless networks for mobile broadband access has led to a proliferation of
applications and services that have greatly increased the demand for spectrum resources. In
response, regulatory agencies have introduced new initiatives for increasing the amount of spec-
trum that can be used to meet this demand. These include auctions for repurposing bands
previously designated for restricted use, such as broadcast television, and also initiatives for
sharing spectrum assigned to government agencies. Proposed methods for sharing spectrum
were highlighted in the 2012 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
nology (PCAST) [7]. Sharing is motivated by the recognition that relocating the associated
services (e.g., satellite) to other bands would be expensive and incur large delays, and that
much of the federal spectrum is used sporadically and often only in isolated geographic regions.
Our objective in this paper is to provide insight into the potential benefits of sharing spectrum
that is intermittently available. We take into account the congestion caused by sharing along
with strategic decisions made by competing Service Providers (SPs). Here we are not concerned
with the incentives needed for the incumbent Federal agencies to make more efficient use of their
spectrum, which could include sharing, but rather assume that a given amount of spectrum is
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available for sharing.1 We then compare the value of the band when shared among all SPs
versus a partition and assignment of the sub-bands among the SPs for their exclusive use.2
We present a model in which multiple wireless SPs compete to provide service to a pool
of nonatomic users. Each SP has its own proprietary band for exclusive use, and in addition,
there is a band assigned to another incumbent (e.g., Federal agency) that can be shared. The
incumbent has priority in the shared band and can pre-empt secondary users. We model this
by assuming that the shared band is available with probability α. We compare two modes
for sharing: licensed sharing in which the shared bandwidth is partitioned among the SPs as
additional proprietary, but intermittent bandwidth, and authorized open access in which the set
of designated SPs all share the entire band with the incumbent. In both cases the SPs compete
for users according to a Cournot game. Specifically, each SP chooses a quantity of users, which
it can allocate across its proprietary and shared bands. The total, or delivered price in each
band paid by a user, determined by a linear demand function, is an announced price plus a
congestion, or latency cost, which increases linearly with load, or users per unit bandwidth. We
compare the equilibrium social welfare and consumer surplus for both licensed and open access
sharing.
Our model can be interpreted in the context of the sharing rules recently approved by the
US Federal Communications Commission for the Citizens Broadband Radio Services (CBRS)
band from 3550 to 3650 MHz (100 MHz total).3 The rules allow for licensed shared access,
corresponding to our licensed model for the shared band, as well as “general authorized access”,
corresponding to our open access model. Our model allows for splitting the shared band between
these two modes. We emphasize, however, that “open access” is restricted to the given set of
competing SPs. We do not consider the possibility of open access competition from additional
SPs that do not have access to their own exclusive use (proprietary) bands. For both access
modes, the spectrum is provided at a granularity of 10 MHz channels. Therefore, when the
spectrum is unavailable, the entire band is unavailable. In that scenario we assume that all
traffic assigned to the shared band by the SPs must be diverted to their respective proprietary
bands.
Comparing the equilibria associated with licensed and open access sharing, we find that
which method should be used depends on the structure of the market. Intuitively, open access
bandwidth should lead to greater congestion and this is indeed the case. However, if there is
sufficient competition, there will also be lower prices. Will prices fall sufficiently to offset the
effect of greater congestion? We find that if the market consists of a large number of SPs, no one
being dominant in terms of the amount of their proprietary bandwidth, the open access regime
generates more consumer surplus than the licensed regime. Total welfare (consumer surplus
plus SP revenue), however, is higher in the licensed regime than for open access. This difference
arises from lower prices in the open access regime but higher latency.
If there is a limit to how much congestion consumers will tolerate, one might consider a
‘mixed’ policy where the shared bandwidth is split between licensed and open access. As the
fraction of licensed bandwidth increases, the SPs shift traffic from the open access band to their
licensed bands, raising prices for the licensed bands. As licensed sharing is initially introduced,
relative to full open access for the entire shared band, the average price (across proprietary and
shared bands) and average latency initially increase. However, once a critical threshold on the
1For example, an incentive for providing shared access, proposed in the PCAST report, might be a ‘scrip’ system
that rewards more efficient use of spectrum. Another approach, discussed in [10], is to assign overlay rights as an
alternative to sharing.
2“Exclusive use” spectrum is also shared, of course, but only by customers of the assigned SP.
3The incumbent service in this band is Naval radar, which is primarily active along the east and west coasts of
the US. The band is currently used sporadically with some predictability about availability. To coordinate use of the
band between Naval radar and secondary lower-priority users, the secondary users must register with a database that
updates and authorizes activities within the band.
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amount of licensed bandwidth is exceeded, prices continue to increase but latency drops. The
observed net effect is that consumer surplus decreases while social welfare increases.
The licensed regime generates greater social welfare provided there is sufficient competition.
What if this is not the case? We model this possibility as a market that contains one or
more SPs characterized by a relatively large amount of proprietary bandwidth. This leads to
a tradeoff: larger SPs are better able to handle the intermittency associated with the shared
band, but allocating more licensed bandwidth to the larger SPs places the smaller SPs at a
disadvantage, compromising the benefits of competition. When there are only a few large SPs,
and low intermittency, consumer surplus therefore benefits the most from allocating more shared
bandwidth to the smaller SPs. Interestingly, if the large SP has sufficient proprietary bandwidth,
allocating the shared band as open access achieves the same outcome, namely, the large SP does
not make use of the open access spectrum due to the congestion from the other SPs.
If the shared bandwidth is to be licensed, how should it be allocated among the SPs? Auc-
tions are the standard response. We find that the natural auction rule for allocating licensed
bandwidth, giving it all to the highest bidder, will be inefficient. The problem is that the
marginal benefit of additional bandwidth increases with the amount of proprietary bandwidth
that each bidder possesses prior to auction. This comes from the fact that such a bidder is
better able to absorb the variability associated with intermittently available bandwidth. Thus,
bidders endowed with a larger amount of initial bandwidth are willing to pay more for additional
bandwidth. This produces a lop sided distribution of bandwidth which reduces consumer and
social welfare. However, if the shared band is open access, a large SP may not use it, leaving
it for smaller SPs. In fact, we give an example where given a choice between open access and
licensed access allocated by auction, perhaps surprisingly, the bidders would strictly prefer open
access.
We also consider the tradeoff between the reliability of the shared band and the amount of
shared bandwidth. Holding the expected quantity of shared bandwidth fixed (i.e., αW where
W is the shared bandwidth), SPs would prefer a smaller amount of shared bandwidth with
greater availability. The variation in how the shared band is valued can vary substantially with
α, depending on the relative amounts of proprietary bandwidth.
1.1 Related work
This paper fits within the stream of work that analyzes the impact of spectrum policy using
models of competition with congestion costs. Examples of such models can be found in [1],
[2] and [5]. It differs from prior work in this stream with its focus on intermittently available
spectrum. A similar Cournot competition model with congestion has been studied in [8]; here
we enrich that model by allowing an additional shared resource along with intermittency.
The paper closest to this one is [6]. There the shared band is non-intermittent, and the SPs
compete according to a Bertrand model. That model is motivated by the scenario in which the
shared band can be designated as unrestricted open access. Price competition, as opposed to
quantity competition, better fits the scenario in which the traffic assigned to the open access
band always stays in that band. There the equilibrium price in the shared open access band is
shown to be zero. Although not explicitly modeled in [6], that also reflects the scenario in which
there may be additional competition from entrants with no proprietary spectrum. In contrast,
for the Cournot model considered here, the price of the open access band is typically strictly
positive reflecting the potential cost of having to carry the traffic in proprietary bands. Another
difference is that here larger SPs are at an advantage because they are better able to handle
intermittency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the Cournot
model with congestion. In Section 3 we analyze this model for the case of two competing SPs.
We think of this as modeling the scenario with an oligopoly of wide-area cellular SPs. Section 4
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examines the opposite case with many SPs, each with a proportionately small share of the avail-
able proprietary bandwidth. This models the scenario in which there are low barriers to entry
so that many operators may wish to set up competing networks within a local area. Numerical
results are presented that illustrate the tradeoffs among competition, prices, and latency. In all
cases we compare consumer surplus and social welfare under different assumptions concerning
the amount of available licensed versus available shared bandwidth. Section 6 presents exten-
sions to concave decreasing demand and convex increasing latencies. Section 7 concludes and
proofs of the main results are given in the appendices.
2 The Model
Suppose N SPs compete to offer wireless service to a common pool of customers. Each SP
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . N} possesses an amount of proprietary (licensed) bandwidth, denoted Bi. In the
status quo, this is the only resource the SPs can access. We are interested in the scenario
where an amount W of new spectrum is made available that is to be shared with an incumbent
user. When the incumbent is actively using the band, it is unavailable to carry traffic for the
SPs. Otherwise, it is available for the SPs. We consider two different policies that govern
the way a particular SP can access this band: licensed access, where a part of the band Wi is
designated for exclusive use by SP i, and open access where all SPs can access the band. We
will allow the shared band to be divided into several disjoint sub-bands, where each sub-band
can be designated as either licensed to a particular SP, or as open access. To simplify the model
description, we first assume that the entire shared band is either licensed to a single SP, or
is open access. We subsequently consider the scenario in which parts of the shared band are
allocated to different SPs for licensed and open access.
We assume a pool of infinitesimal customers or users with a downward slopping inverse
demand curve
P (y) = 1− y, (1)
which gives the marginal utility obtained by the yth customer served, where all customers require
the same amount of (average) service. As in [6], the price the yth customer is willing to pay for
service is given by the difference between their marginal utility and the latency or congestion
cost they experience. Following [6], we refer to the sum of the latency cost and the service price
as the delivered price.
If SP i serves xi customers on its proprietary band, the resulting latency cost is given by
`i(xi) =
xi
Bi
, (2)
which is increasing in the amount of traffic served and decreasing in the amount of bandwidth
available to the SP. When each SP i serves wi customers using the entire band of secondary
spectrum, we model the latency by
`w
(∑
i
wi
)
=
1
W
∑
i
wi, (3)
which is now increasing in the sum of the traffic from the SPs and decreasing in the available
secondary spectrum W . Note, if the entire secondary band is licensed to a single SP i, this
corresponds to constraining wj = 0, j 6= i. We assume that the shared band is intermittently
available with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. When unavailable, the traffic designated by SP i for the
secondary band, wi, must be off-loaded onto SP i’s proprietary band.
4 Thus, the ‘expected’
4This is a reasonable assumption when the customers have a high dis-utility for not receiving service.
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latency of traffic served by SP i on its proprietary band is
¯`
i = (1− α) · `i(xi + wi) + α · `i(xi). (4)
The ‘expected’ latency of traffic experienced by SP i’s traffic on the secondary spectrum will be
¯`
w = α · `w
(∑
i
wi
)
+ (1− α) · `i(xi + wi). (5)
Proprietary spectrum is assumed to be available at all times.5
The SPs compete according to a Cournot model.6 Each SP i decides on a pair (xi, wi),
which represents the amount of traffic it will carry. Given a choice of (xi, wi) by each SP i, the
resulting price paid by the users will be the difference between their marginal utility and the
resulting expected latency. Specifically, the delivered price for the user load is
pd = P
(∑
i
(xi + wi)
)
= 1−
∑
i
(xi + wi). (6)
The actual price paid for service depends on the latency experienced by the traffic. For SP i’s
licensed band, the price is given by
pi = pd − (1− α) · `i(xi + wi)− α · `i(xi), (7)
and for the secondary band, the price paid by SP i’s users is given by
pwi = pd − α · `w
(∑
i
wi
)
− (1− α) · `i(xi + wi). (8)
Each SP i seeks to maximize its revenue given by
Ri = pixi + p
w
i wi. (9)
The model just described assumes that each SP serves two classes of customers: one using
their proprietary band and the other with the shared spectrum, charging each class different
prices. However, one can also interpret the model as one where there is only one class of
customers and the SP decides whether to serve each customer via the proprietary or secondary
bands. Formally, we think of xixi+wi and
wi
xi+wi
as the probability that a consumer is served via
proprietary spectrum or secondary spectrum, respectively. The price that SP i charges is then
p¯i =
xi
xi + wi
pi +
wi
xi + wi
pwi . (10)
The revenue of SP i is still given by (9).
2.1 Shared Sub-bands
In the preceding model the entire band of shared spectrum is either licensed to one SP, or is
open access. More generally, we allow this band to be divided into multiple disjoint sub-bands
5As we show below, our model can also be applied to the case where some portion of the proprietary spectrum is
intermittently available, provided that the remainder is always available.
6FCC report 10-81 [4] states that mobile wireless SPs compete on dimensions other than price. In particular, a
network upgrade can be interpreted as an attempt to expand capacity.
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with bandwidths Wk ≥ 0, k = 0, 1, . . . , N , with
N∑
i=0
Wk = W.
Here, Wi represents the part of the shared band allocated to user i as licensed bandwidth and
W0 represents any remaining bandwidth that is allocated for open access (where any of these
terms may be zero if no bandwidth is allocated in that way). The resulting traffic load for a
sub-band with Wi units of bandwidth is then given by y/Wi where y is the total traffic in that
sub-band. We assume that when the incumbent is active, it claims the entire band so that all
sub-bands must be vacated.
Following the preceding model, a SP would then specify an amount of traffic for each shared
sub-band it is permitted to use, as well as for its proprietary band. However, the next result
shows that we can ‘pool’ all of the licensed bands assigned to an SP and represent them as a
single equivalent band that serves the aggregate traffic on these sub-bands. Formally, an SP
with proprietary bandwidth Bi and licensed shared bandwidth Wi can be viewed as having a
single band having bandwidth Bi + Wi with probability α and bandwidth Bi with probability
1− α.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose SP i has access to Bi units of proprietary spectrum, Wi units of licensed
shared spectrum and W0 units of open access spectrum; let xi, wi,L and wi,0 be the amounts of
traffic served on each respective band in equilibrium. This is equivalent to a model where instead
of allocating xi and wi,L separately, SP i allocates the total traffic x˜i = xi+wi,L to a single band
where the price is determined by
pi = pd − (1− α) x˜i + wi,0
Bi
− α x˜i
Bi +Wi
. (11)
Proof: Given the traffic allocations of SP i as stated in the lemma, the resulting price in the
proprietary spectrum will be
pi = pd − (1− α)xi + wi,L + wi,0
Bi
− α xi
Bi
and the price in the shared spectrum will be
pw,Li = pd − (1− α)
xi + wi,L + wi,0
Bi
− αwi,L
Wi
.
Note that if the SP changes xi and wi,L while keeping x˜i = xi + wi,L fixed, this affects pi
and pw,Li but leaves all other prices for all other SPs and bands fixed at the same values. Hence,
at any equilibrium with given x˜i, the values of xi and wi,L must solve:
max xipi + wi,Lp
w,L
i
s.t. xi + wi,L = x˜i.
We can replace the objective function of this optimization problem by
−xi xi
Bi
− wi,Lwi,L
Wi
since all of the other terms only depend on the sum xi + wi,L. From the first order conditions
for optimality, it follows that
xi
Bi
=
wi,L
Wi
.
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This implies that the price charged in each of these bands must be the same. Further, since
xi
Bi
=
wi,L
Wi
=
x˜i
Bi +Wi
,
this price can be written as (11).
Similarly, given multiple subbands of shared spectrum that are designated as open access,
those subbands can also be pooled and treated as a single (intermittent) open access band with
the combined bandwidth. Hence, in the following, without loss of generality, we will focus on the
scenario with one band of licensed shared spectrum per SP and at most one open access band.
The next lemma shows that in the absence of open access spectrum we can further simplify the
model and represent each SP as though it has an equivalent amount of licensed spectrum.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose SP i has access to Bi units of proprietary spectrum and Wi units of
licensed shared spectrum, and that there is no open access spectrum (W0 = 0). In this case, SP
i can be equivalently represented as an SP with Ti units of proprietary spectrum and no other
licensed spectrum, where
Ti = Bi
Bi +Wi
Bi + (1− α)Wi . (12)
This follows from noting that when wi,0 = 0, the expression for pi in (11) can equivalently
be written as
pi = pd − x˜i
Ti
,
where Ti is given by (12). Of course, Ti is an increasing function of reliability α with minimum
value Bi (proprietary bandwidth) when α = 0, and maximum value Bi +Wi when α = 1.
2.2 Reliability versus Amount of Shared Bandwidth
In practice, there may be some flexibility in determining the availability of the shared bandwidth,
α. That leads to a trade-off between W and α. Consider the case Wi = W , in which all
bandwidth is allocated to SP i. We ask whether SP i would preferW units of bandwidth available
with probability α, or αW units of non-intermittent bandwidth. In other words, is it better
to have a smaller amount of bandwidth always available, or a larger amount with intermittent
availability, fixing the average? Since B1 + αW > T1, the SP would prefer the smaller amount
of certain bandwidth. Fig. 1 shows plots of Ti versus α with fixed αWi, the average amount
of shared bandwidth. The plots show that Ti is monotonically increasing with α, which implies
that an SP always prefers higher reliability with less bandwidth. Furthermore, the left plot
shows that the variation in Ti with α can be substantial. That corresponds to the scenario in
which Wi = 1 and B = 0.1, so that the shared band greatly increases the amount of spectrum
potentially available. The knee of the curve, however, occurs when α > 0.7, indicating that
the band must be relatively reliable in order to provide a significant enhancement of available
spectrum. In contrast, the variation shown in the right plot is much smaller since W << B.
2.3 Welfare Measures
We will focus on two basic welfare measures, consumer surplus and social welfare. The consumer
surplus associated with an equilibrium allocation is the difference between the amount the
customers receiving service would be willing to pay and the total cost they incur. Since all
7
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
11
11.2
0.1, 1B Wα= = 1, 1B Wα= =
Figure 1: Plots of the equivalent bandwidth Ti in (12) versus α with fixed average bandwidth αW .
customers incur the same cost pd, it follows that the consumer surplus is given by
CS(z) =
∫ z
0
(P (y)− P (z)) dy = z
2
2
. (13)
where z denotes the total number of customers served over all bands. Note that CS(z) is a
strictly increasing function of z so that to compare the consumer welfare of different equilibria
we need only compare the number of customers served. The social welfare of an equilibrium is
the sum of the consumer surplus and the total revenue earned by all SPs.
3 Two Service Providers
We start with the scenario in which there are two competing SP. This allows an illustration of
the basic properties of the model. We then consider scenarios with more than two SPs in the
subsequent section.
3.1 Shared Licensed Access
We first examine the scenario in which all of the shared bandwidth is available for licensed access.
From Lemma 2.2, we can view each provider i as having Ti units of proprietary spectrum, which
includes its portion of the shared spectrum. For N = 2, the conditions for Cournot competition
reduce to:
pd = 1− x1 − x2
p1 = pd − x1
T1
= 1− x1
(
1 +
1
T1
)
− x2
p2 = pd − x1
T2
= 1− x2
(
1 +
1
T2
)
− x1
where the SPs choose x1 and x2, respectively. SP i’s revenue is given by Ri = pixi, which from
these relations is a quadratic funciton of xi.
The next result characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for this setting. We show in
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Theorem 6.1 that the underlying game is a potential game. From Lemma 2.2, the model reduces
to an equivalent model with no intermittent spectrum, which corresponds to a special case of
the model studied in [8].
THEOREM 3.1 There is a unique Nash equilibrium given by
x∗1 =
T1T2 + 2T1
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
x∗2 =
T1T2 + 2T2
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
with the equilibrium prices given by
p∗1 =
T1T2 + 2T1 + T2 + 2
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
p∗2 =
T1T2 + 2T2 + T1 + 2
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
.
This theorem enables us to deduce the following comparitive statics.
THEOREM 3.2 Let Ri(T1, T2) be the equilibrium revenue of SP i ∈ {1, 2} given that each SP
i has Ti units of equivalent proprietary spectrum.
1. R1(T1, T2) is strictly increasing and concave in T1 holding T2 fixed.
2. ∂R1∂T2 < 0 .
3. If T1 > T2, then
∂R1
∂T1
> ∂R2∂T2 .
Theorem 3.2 has two immediate implications. First, unsurprisingly, each SP would prefer to
have larger amounts of the equivalent shared bandwidth than not, other parameters held fixed.
Second, an increase in the equivalent shared bandwidth of one’s rival results in a decrease in
one’s own revenue. Interestingly, because Ti increases with Bi, the marginal value of additional
equivalent licensed bandwidth is larger for the SP with the larger initial amount of bandwidth.
From (13) the consumer surplus is given by
CS(z) =
(x∗1 + x∗2)2
2
, (14)
and from Theorem 3.1 we have
x∗1 + x
∗
2 =
T1T2 + 2T1
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
+
T1T2 + 2T2
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
=
2T1T2 + 2(T1 + T2)
3T1T2 + 4 + 4(T1 + T2)
. (15)
Referring to the expression for Ti in (12), consumer surplus is therefore a non-linear function of
W1,W2. This means that for some parameter settings consumer surplus will not be maximized
by setting W1 = W or W2 = W . To understand the implication of this suppose the incumbent
decides to allocate all W units of new bandwidth by auction to the highest bidder. The resulting
allocation need not maximize consumer surplus. If B1 = B2, then one can show that the new
spectrum should be divided equally between the two SPs to maximize consumer welfare. In
general, the allocation that maximizes consumer surplus will make the Ti of the SP with the
larger Bi larger than the Ti of the other SP (though the smaller SP may still get a larger
amount of Wi). It is also the case that the SP with the larger Bi benefits more from an increase
in spectrum that is intermittent. (The smaller α is, the greater the difference in benefit.) This
is because the larger SP is better able to absorb the fluctuations.
9
3.2 Shared Open Access
We now assume that each SP has its own proprietary bandwidth and that the additional shared
bandwidth W is open access. We begin with the symmetric case where each SP has the same
amount of proprietary bandwidth, i.e., B1 = B2 = B/2.
THEOREM 3.3 When B1 = B2 = B/2 the unique Nash equilibrium is given by the quantities
x∗i =
3
W
9
W +
12
B +
12
BW +
16(1−α)
B2
=
3B2
9B2 + 12BW + 12B + 16(1− α)W
w∗i =
4
B
9
W +
12
B +
12
BW +
16(1−α)
B2
=
4BW
9B2 + 12BW + 12B + 16(1− α)W .
for i = 1, 2.
In particular, both SPs make use of the unlicensed bandwidth. Direct computation using
the preceding quantities shows that both SP revenue and consumer surplus increase with the
following parameter variations:
1. B increases holding W and α fixed;
2. W increases holding B and α fixed;
3. α increases holding B and W fixed.
We remark that for the analogous Bertrand model considered in [6], the SP revenue generally
decreases as W increases. This is due to the shift in customers to the open access band, where
the equilibrium price is zero. In contrast, for the Cournot model the corresponding shift in
traffic generally lowers the price, but that is offset by an increase in the number of customers
served.
We next consider the asymmetric scenario in which B1 6= B2. As B1 increases relative to B2
we obtain the following result.
THEOREM 3.4 Suppose that a fraction βW of the shared bandwidth is provisioned as open
access, and the remainder is partitioned as Wi, i = 1, 2, and allocated as licensed bandwidth
to the respective SPs, where β ∈ [0, 1] and W1 + W2 = (1 − β)W . Then, there is a unique
equilibrium with w∗1 = 0, x∗1 > 0 and x∗2 > w∗2 > 0 if and only if
B1 +W1 + 2(1− α)W1
B1
≥ 2(βW +W2) + 2B2 + 2 + 4(1− α)βW +W2
B2
. (16)
For β = 1, all the shared bandwidth is open access and condition (16) simplifies to B1 ≥
2W + 4(1− α)WB2 + 2B2 + 2.
Hence, if an SP has an amount of proprietary bandwidth that greatly exceeds that held by
the other SP, there is a range of W for which it will not make use of the shared bandwidth,
leaving it for the smaller SP. Interestingly, as α decreases, i.e., the shared band is more likely to
be pre-empted, the ‘larger’ SP is more likely to use it. This is because its proprietary bandwidth
makes it better able to handle the traffic in the event of pre-emption.
The proof is given as part of Appendix 8.8 (see section 8.8.4). There it is also shown that
conditioned on the shared spectrum being available,
x∗i
Bi +Wi
≤ w
∗
i +
w∗−i
2
βW
≤ w
∗
1 + w
∗
2
βW
,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, and where −i denotes the other SP. Suppose that β = 1, so that Wi = 0. The
condition then states that when the shared band is available, the congestion in the proprietary
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bands is always less than the congestion in the open access band. If SP i uses the shared band,
it is shown that the first inequality is tight. Additionally, if in equilibrium w∗i > 0 for both SPs,
then for SP i the congestion in the open access band is strictly greater than the congestion in
its licensed bands by w∗−i/(2W ). Furthermore, if in equilibrium w
∗
i = 0, then the open access
band and proprietary band for the other provider −i have the same congestion level, which is
at least twice the congestion in SP i’s proprietary band. It is this additional congestion which
causes SP i to assign wi = 0, and to use only its proprietary bands. The appendix also considers
N > 2 asymmetric SPs, and gives a condition for when all but one SP assigns traffic to the open
access band.
3.3 Numerical Examples
To illustrate the behavior of the SPs in scenarios not covered by Theorem 3.4 we present a series
of numerical examples showing comparative statics with different assumptions concerning how
the shared bandwidth is allocated.
Quantities and prices: Figure 2 illustrates how quantities and prices in the shared and
proprietary bands change as the amount of proprietary bandwidth for SP 1 (B1) increases.
Figure 2a shows that as B1 increases, SP 1 increases the quantity of customers x1 served in
its proprietary band, and decreases its allocation of customers w1 to the shared band. SP 2
maintains nearly constant quantities in both bands. The vertical line shows the threshold B∗1
at which w1 becomes zero. For B1 > B
∗
1 the quantities are nearly constant with only slight
variations due to the limited competition with only two SPs.
Figure 2b shows that SP 1 charges higher prices than SP 2 in both bands since it is able to
provide lower latency than SP 2. For B1 < B
∗
1 , SP 1’s prices increase, due to decreasing latency,
whereas SP 2’s prices decrease to maintain its quantity of customers. For B1 > B
∗
1 , p1 increases
slowly, since latency in that band continues to decrease, whereas the remaining prices decrease
to maintain the nearly constant quantities shown in Figure 2a.
Social welfare: Figure 3 shows social welfare achieved by four different schemes for allocating
the shared spectrum. These schemes are motivated by the discussion following Theorem 3.2,
which considers the outcome of a winner-take-all auction of the shared band. The label “SP 1”
in Figure 3 indicates all of the shared spectrum is allocated to SP 1, which always possesses the
greater amount of proprietary spectrum. Similarly, the label “SP 2” allocates all of the shared
spectrum to SP 2. We compare the social welfare for these outcomes with that obtained by
allocating the shared spectrum as open access, labeled “Open access”. Finally, the label “Split”
allocates the shared spectrum to equalize the equivalent always-available bandwidths T1 and T2,
if possible, or otherwise allocates all of the shared bandwidth to SP 2.
Figure 3a depicts how social welfare changes as a function of B1 ≥ B2 = 1 (with α = 0.9
and W = 10). Assigning W to the smaller provider SP 2 always achieves higher social welfare
since this enables SP 2 to compete more effectively with SP 1. However, as implied by Theorem
3.2, SP 1 has an incentive to bid a higher amount for W than SP 2. The resulting loss in
social welfare is indicated in the figure. This analysis suggests that an auction for W should be
enhanced to contain more options.7 An example is provided in Appendix 8.1, which considers
the scenario in which the SPs can bid for the shared spectrum with the following options: it is
licensed entirely to SP 1 or SP 2, or it is shared as open access. The example shows that both
SPs may prefer that the shared bandwidth be open access rather than licensed.
7A related auction for the allocation of a congestible resource is proposed in [3]. Our setting is more difficult because
there are two externalities to be managed: congestion and downstream competition.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium quantities xi, wi, and prices pi, p
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i , i = 1, 2, as B1 increases with B2 = 1,
W = 10 and α = 0.9.
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For the schemes considered in Figure 3, open access sharing yields the highest social welfare
except for a small region where the scheme “SP 2” does marginally better. The “Vacate flag”
indicates the values of B1 for which SP 1 does not use the shared spectrum, so that it is effectively
allocated to SP 2. Hence in that region the social welfare for open access coincides with that
for scheme SP 2.
When it is possible to set T1 = T2, the “Split” scheme achieves a higher social welfare than
either scheme SP 1 or SP 2. This indicates that among schemes that partition the shared
spectrum between the two SPs, there is an optimal split that lies between the two extreme
schemes SP 1 and SP 2. Open access sharing can be thought of as a more flexible split between
the two SPs. Figure 3b depicts how social welfare changes as W increases for the four allocation
schemes considered. The relative differences observed previously also apply in this regime.
However, for open access sharing, as W increases, in equilibrium, SP 1 always uses the shared
spectrum.
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Figure 3: Comparison of social welfare for various schemes for allocating the shared bandwidth W ;
B2 = 1 and α = 0.9.
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4 Many Symmetric Service Providers
We now examine the scenario with an arbitrary number of SPs N , where the SPs are symmetric.
That is, they each have the same amount of licensed bandwidth (including licensed shared
bandwidth). Specifically, the shared band is split into an open access part with bandwidth βW
and a licensed, or proprietary part with bandwidth (1−β)W for a fixed β ∈ [0, 1]. Each SP has
its own proprietary bandwidth B/N , and the licensed part of the shared band is split equally
among the SPs. The shared band therefore adds (1 − β)W/N units of licensed bandwidth to
each SP with availability α. We will compare the total welfare, total revenue, and consumer
surplus when the shared band is allocated as licensed versus open access. Analytical results are
presented for N →∞, reflecting perfect competition.
Let (x¯(N), w¯(N)) denote the symmetric equilibrium allocation, i.e., x¯(N) and w¯(N) are the
same for all SPs. Here x¯ and w¯ refer, respectively, to the quantities allocated to the licensed
bands, including the licensed part of the shared band, and the open access band.
Lemma 4.1 For any finite N the equilibrium is symmetric and unique.
THEOREM 4.2 As N →∞, the limiting equilibrium is specified by
(x∗, w∗) = lim
N→∞
(Nx¯(N), Nw¯(N)),
where
x∗ =
(
B + (1− β)W )B(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα,
w∗ =
2βWB(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα,
(17)
and the limiting prices in the licensed and open access bands are given by
p =
(1− α)(B +W (1 + β))+Bα(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα,
pw =
(1− α)(B +W (1 + β))(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα.
(18)
The proof is given in Appendix 8.5. There the expressions for x¯(N), w¯(N) are given for arbitrary
N .
Theorem 4.2 has the following implications.
1. From (18) p > pw for all α > 0. Also, from (17), the congestion, or load in the open access
band (users/total bandwidth) is
w∗
βW
= 2
x∗
B + (1− β)W . (19)
Therefore, as N →∞, the congestion in the open access band is twice the congestion in the
licensed/proprietary band, and the announced price for the open access band is lower than
that for the licensed band. That is because the SPs have an incentive to shift traffic into
the open access band, and then charge a higher price for the lower latency experienced in
the licensed band. More generally, for arbitrary N , the expressions in the appendix show
that the congestion in the open access band is 2N/(N + 1) times the congestion in the
proprietary bands.
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2. Unlike the classical Cournot model of competition, the prices do not converge to zero as the
number of competing agents becomes large. This is due to the tradeoff between announced
price and congestion cost.
3. In the special case where the shared band is always available, α = 1 and
p =
1
W (1 + β) +B + 2
, pw = 0. (20)
That is, the price for the open access band is zero. This is analogous to the equilibrium
with Bertrand (price) competition, derived in [6]. There it is also observed that the price
of the open access band is zero, although here that occurs only when there are sufficiently
many SPs.
THEOREM 4.3 As N → ∞, consumer surplus is maximized when β = 1. However, total
revenue and social welfare are maximized when β = 0.
From (17), the total traffic carried is given by
x∗ + w∗ =
B
(
B +W (1 + β)
)(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα.
Hence the total traffic along with consumer surplus is maximized when β = 1. The rest of the
proof is given in Section 8.6.
Figure 4 illustrates the change in social welfare that takes place as N increases. The plots
show social welfare versus N for both β = 0 (all licensed) and β = 1 (all open access), and for
different values of W . Focusing on the bottom two curves for W = 1, the curves cross when
N ≤ 3, i.e., for N < 3, open access achieves higher social welfare than licensed access, and vice
versa for N > 3. This is consistent with Theorem 4.3. Note that the corresponding crossover
value of N increases as W increases.
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Figure 4: Social welfare achieved for β = 0 and β = 1 as a function of the number of (symmetric)
SPs N for different values of W . The total proprietary bandwidth B = 1 and α = 0.9
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4.1 Degraded Sharing
So far we have assumed that the latency experienced by serving traffic load x with bandwidth
W is x/W regardless if the traffic load comes from a single SP or multiple SPs. In practice,
because less coordination is expected among SPs in the open access band, it could be that the
latency experienced for a given load in the open access band is greater than if the same load
were served by a single SP. That would make licensed access more attractive and with enough
degradation, the conclusion of Theorem 4.3 that open access maximizes consumer surplus may
no longer hold. In this section we examine this possibility.
We model the degradation associated with open access by introducing a degradation factor
d ≤ 1 and assume that when traffic load x is served with open access bandwidth W , that the
congestion cost is
`W (x) =
x
dW
.
In other words, the “effective bandwidth” seen by the users of an open access band is dW < W .
(Equivalently, the latency increases by 1/d.)
Lemma 4.4 In the symmetric model with N ≥ 2 firms, if d > N+12N , allocating all of the shared
spectrum as open access maximizes consumer welfare, whereas if d < N+12N , allocating all of the
shared spectrum as licensed maximizes consumer welfare.
The proof is given in Appendix 8.5.1, and is a consequence of the first property following
Theorem 4.2. Note that the threshold N+12N does not depend on α, W or B. This threshold is
3/4 when N = 2 and decreases to 1/2 as N becomes large. Hence for large N , unless the latency
in the open access spectrum is more than twice that for licensed use due to lack of coordination,
given the same load, open access still achieves larger consumer surplus.
4.2 Latency, price, and social welfare
To gain further insight into the effects of open access bandwidth on latency and price, Figures
5a and 5b show parametric plots of average price, consumer surplus, and total welfare versus
average latency as the fraction of open access bandwidth β increases from zero to one. The
average price is given by Lemma 2.1, and the average latency is similarly
¯`(N) =
x¯(N)
x¯(N) + w¯(N)
¯`
p(N) +
w¯(N)
x¯(N) + w¯(N)
¯`
w(N) (21)
where
¯`
p(N) = α
Nx¯(N)
B + (1− β)W + (1− α)
N(x¯(N) + w¯(N))
B
(22)
and
¯`
w(N) = α
Nw¯(N)
βW
+ (1− α)N(x¯(N) + w¯(N))
B
(23)
are the latencies associated with the proprietary and shared bands, respectively. The figure
shows plots for N = 200 and N = 2, and α = 1.
No sharing (β = 0) corresponds to the lowest latency on each curve (left-most point), and as
β increases from zero to one, the latency increases to the highest value (right-most point), and
then subsequently decreases to the final point corresponding to full sharing (β = 1). Focusing on
Fig. 5a, as β increases from zero, the average price increases slightly as latency increases. This
is because when βW is small, the shift in load from the proprietary to shared band congests the
shared band, increasing both average latency and price. In this region the consumer surplus and
total welfare decrease. As β increases further, the SPs lower the price to continue to shift load
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(a) N = 200
(b) N = 2
Figure 5: Parametric plots of average price, consumer surplus, and total welfare versus average
latency as the fraction of shared bandwidth β increases from zero to one.
to the shared band, and the average latency continues to increase. In this region the consumer
surplus increases while the total welfare continues to decrease due to the decrease in SP revenue.
Finally, as β is further increased towards one, both the price and latency fall, and consumer
surplus increases more rapidly, causing total welfare to increase. Even so, the total welfare with
full sharing is slightly below that with no sharing, as expected from Theorem 4.3.
Comparing Figure 5a with 5b, the additional competition with N = 200 results in a lower
price and higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the increase in open access bandwidth has a
more pronounced effect on the quantities shown. Further examples with α < 1 show consistent
trends, but with less variation with latency due to the diminished benefit of adding the shared
bandwidth.
4.3 Effects of Increasing W
Fig. 6 illustrates the effect of increasing W on social welfare, consumer surplus, and revenue
for large N . Social welfare is shown for the cases where the shared bandwidth is entirely open
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Figure 6: Total welfare versus additional bandwidth W with a large number of SPs when the shared
band is open access (β = 1) and proprietary (β = 0). Revenue and consumer surplus are also shown
for β = 1.
access (β = 1) and proprietary (β = 0). Both curves are monotonically increasing, but their
shape changes from convex to concave when the shared bandwidth changes from open access to
proprietary. In particular, the slope at W = 0 is zero when the shared band is open access, but
is positive when the shared band is proprietary. This behavior has also been observed within
the Bertrand model of price competition [6]. There, with a small number of SPs, adding a
small amount of open access bandwidth can decrease the social welfare (i.e., the slope at W = 0
can be negative). Here the additional incremental shared bandwidth increases social welfare for
smaller values of N (not shown), but the increase tends to zero as N becomes large. The curves
for revenue and consumer surplus displayed in Figure 6 correspond to open access. Here revenue
decreases, but for β = 0 the revenue initially increases slightly as W increases from zero (not
shown).
We can obtain further insight by letting W become large. In this limit, some of the expres-
sions simplify, easing the analysis. For a given number of SPs N , taking this limit and using
the equilibrium expressions in the appendices, the total mass of customers served is given by
ρ(N) = x¯(N) + w¯(N) =
B
B +B/N + 2(1− α) .
This does not depend on β and so if there is sufficient shared bandwidth, it does not matter
how it is allocated. The social welfare for licensed and open access shared bandwidth therefore
become the same as illustrated in Fig. 6. This is intuitive since as W → ∞ the congestion
externality disappears in the shared spectrum, so open access and licensed access provide the
same value to consumers. Note that ρ(N), and hence consumer welfare, increases with N and
approaches the asymptote
ρ¯ =
B
B + 2(1− α) .
In the limit of large W , the social welfare as a function of N is given by
SW (N) = ρ(N)− ρ
2(N)
2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B
)
.
This expression is an increasing function of ρ(N) for ρ(N) ≤ ρ¯. Hence, SW (N) is also increasing
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with N and approaches the limiting value
B
2(B + 2(1− α)) =
ρ¯
2
.
Note that ρ¯ is a strictly increasing function of α ∈ [0, 1] and for α = 1, we have ρ¯ = 1, meaning
the entire market is served, resulting in a social welfare of 12 , which is the maximum possible for
the assumed inverse demand. For α < 1, we have ρ¯ < 1, meaning that even with an unbounded
amount of shared spectrum, some users are not served due to the intermittent nature of that
spectrum, so that some potential welfare is not obtained.
As previously noted for arbitrary W , the previous results show that when α < 1 and N →∞,
the aggregate profit of the SPs is strictly positive. In this case, the limiting aggregate firm profit
is given by
ρ¯− ρ¯2
(
1 +
(1− α)
B
)
=
B(1− α)
(B + 2(1− α))2 .
Differentiating this with respect to α, it can be seen that for B < 2, the aggregate firm profit first
increases with α and then decreases, with the maximum firm profits occurring when α = 1−B/2.
For B ≥ 2, aggregate firm profits decrease with α, and so the maximum occurs when α = 0. In
other words, given any value of B, the SPs would prefer that the shared spectrum is intermittent,
and if B is large enough, they would prefer that the shared spectrum is never available. Adding
new spectrum to the market reduces congestion, but also intensifies competition. The latter
effect becomes more pronounced the less intermittent the spectrum becomes and apparently
dominates the impact on the providers’ profits.
5 Asymmetric Providers
To provide insight into the effects of asymmetric (large and small) SPs with different amounts
of bandwidth, we now consider the following two scenarios:
• There is a single SP with proprietary bandwidth B1. A second band B2 is split evenly
among N small SPs, where N is assumed to be large.
• Bands B1 and B2 are each split among N SPs. We will assume that B1 ≥ B2.
Varying B1 relative to B2 then captures varying degrees of asymmetry. The two scenarios differ
in the amount of competition experienced by the SP(s) with the larger bandwidth allocation.
As before, the shared band is split between an open access part (bandwidth βW ) and pro-
prietary part (bandwidth (1− β)W ). The open access part is shared among all SPs, large and
small. The proprietary part is further split into two sub-bands with bandwidths W1 and W2
allocated to the large and small SPs, respectively. The shared band is intermittently available,
so that a small SP has proprietary bandwidth B2/N , which is always available, plus W2/N ,
which is available with probability α.
For the first scenario, let x1(N) and w1(N) denote the quantities served by the large SP
in its proprietary and open access spectrum, respectively. The corresponding quantities for
the ith small SP are x2,i(N) and w2,i(N), respectively. By symmetry x2,i(N) and w2,i(N) are
independent of i. As N →∞, the equilibrium quantities are defined as
(x∗1, w
∗
1, x
∗
2, w
∗
2) = lim
N→∞
[x1(N), w1(N), Nx2,i(N), Nw2,i(N)] (24)
It is shown in Appendix 8.7 that those quantities are the solution to a set of four linear equations.
Similarly, in the second scenario, x1(N) and w1(N) are replaced by x1,j(N) and w1,j(N), where
j denotes an SP in the larger group. From symmetry those quantities are independent of j, and
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as N →∞, the corresponding equilibrium quantities are
(x∗1, w
∗
1, x
∗
2, w
∗
2) = lim
N→∞
[Nx1,j(N), Nw1,j(N), Nx2,i(N), Nw2,i(N)] (25)
As for the scenario with two asymmetric SPs, here also a larger SP does not always use the
open access spectrum. In addition, for the second asymmetric scenario considered here with
many larger SPs, a smaller SP may not use the open access spectrum. The associated conditions
are stated next.
THEOREM 5.1 For the first scenario with asymmetric SPs, if
B1 +W1 + 2(1− α)W1
B1
> 2(1− α)2βW +W2
B2
(26)
then there exists an N∗ such that for all N ≥ N∗, SP 1 does not use the open access spectrum,
i.e., w∗1(N) = 0.
For the second scenario, a larger (smaller) SP i does not use the open access spectrum for
all N ≥ N∗∗ (for some N∗∗) when
Wi
Bi
>
2βW +Wj
Bj
, i 6= j. (27)
where j corresponds to a smaller (larger) SP.
The proof can be found in Appendix 8.8.4.
The first condition (26) resembles, but is not identical to the condition in Theorem 3.4. This
is because here a portion of the licensed spectrum is also intermittent. Note that for α = 1 the
larger SP always vacates the open access spectrum. Also, for α = 1, the price in the shared
spectrum is zero, which is also true for the analogous model with Bertrand competition [6]. The
first condition in Theorem 5.1 is satisfied when β and W2 are small. In that case, the smaller
SPs congest the open access band, lowering the price, and thereby make it less desirable for the
large SP(s). For small β the second condition (27) becomes Wi/Bi > Wj/Bj . If Wi > Wj , then
the condition can be satisfied with Bi < Bj , i.e., the smaller SPs vacate the open access band.
This is due to competition among the larger SPs, which causes them to shift traffic to the open
access band, increasing congestion in that band and lowering the price so that the smaller SPs
have no incentive to use it.
The condition (27) does not depend on α, in contrast to (26), because for large N , the
additional congestion caused by intermittency is bounded, and is shared among the N large
SPs. Hence that additional congestion does not significantly affect an individual SP. As α
decreases, the threshold N∗∗ must increase in order for the condition to apply.
Fig. 7 illustrates how the split of the shared band W into W1 and W2 affects consumer
surplus. Here B1 = 0.9, B2 = 0.1, W = 2, β = 0 (all of W is split between the SPs), and plots
are shown for different values of α. The figures show consumer welfare as a function of W1/W
for N = 2 (Fig. 7a) and N = 60 (Fig. 7b). As α increases, Fig. 7a shows that the fraction
of bandwidth that maximizes consumer surplus shifts to the left. This is due to the tradeoff
between the larger SP’s ability to handle intermittent traffic, and competition. That is, when
α is small, most of the shared band should be allocated to the larger SP, since the larger SP is
better able to handle the intermittent availability of the shared band. As α increases, so that
the band becomes more reliable, the consumer surplus increases by shifting bandwidth to the
smaller SP to increase competition. In contrast, Fig. 7b shows that with many competing SPs
it is always best to give most of the shared bandwidth to the larger SPs, independent of α.
As for the symmetric case, numerical examples show that social welfare decreases with β
when N → ∞, which is the same as for the symmetric case. In contrast, for N = 2 the total
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Figure 7: Consumer surplus versus the fraction of shared bandwidth assigned to SP 1 (W1/W ) with
different values of α.
welfare increases with β, as discussed in Section 3. Hence at these extreme values designating
the entire band W as open access (N = 2) or proprietary (N → ∞) maximizes total welfare.
Additional numerical examples indicate that this is also true for arbitrary N .
6 Extensions to General Latency and Demand
In this section we establish existence of a unique equilibrium for the Cournot game with more
general demand and latency functions. The model allows the shared band to be split between
licensed and open access. When the shared band is available, the total licensed bandwidth of a
SP changes and hence so does the latency cost experienced by customers served on the licensed
band. In addition, with a linear inverse demand function, linear latencies in the open access
bands and general convex increasing latencies in the licensed bands, we also prove that the game
is a potential game.8 This fact is used in deriving some of our earlier results.
Assume that when the intermittent band is available, the latency function is given by `i,w(·),
and `i(·) when not available.
THEOREM 6.1 For the Cournot game with N ≥ 2 providers, each with proprietary spectrum
and additional intermittently available shared spectrum, if the inverse demand P (·) is concave
decreasing, and the latencies `i(·), `i,w(·) and `w(·) are convex increasing, then an equilibrium
always exists. The equilibrium is unique if either P ′(0) < 0 and `′w(0) > 0 or `′i(0) > 0 and
`′i,w(0) > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
In the absence of open access spectrum, Theorem 6.1 holds without the condition on `′w(·) and
`′i,w(·) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . When bandwidths W1,W2, . . . ,WN with intermittent availability
α are added, this is equivalent to the set of non-intermittent bands T1, · · · , TN , where Ti is give
in (12). With linear decreasing inverse demand, the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
follows from Proposition 2 in [8].
We now assume two SPs with propriety spectrum only, i.e., any shared spectrum is licensed
and always available, so that we can assume W = 0. The proofs of the following propositions
are in Appendix 8.9.
8While the result in [8] proves the existence of a unique equilibrium for linear inverse demand and latencies (with
a more general shared model), it does not provide the potential game characterization.
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Proposition 6.2 Given an equilibrium (interior point) with two providers, concave decreasing
inverse demand, and convex increasing latency, if a marginal amount of bandwidth is given
to provider k, then a sequence of best responses converges to a new equilibrium in which the
quantity xk and revenue Rk each increase and x−k and R−k each decrease.
According to Theorem 6.1, the sequence of best responses must converge to a unique equi-
librium. This extends Theorem 3.2, and states that in this more general setting an increase in
one provider’s bandwidth again causes a decrease in the competitor’s quantity and revenue.
Proposition 6.3 For the scenario in Prop. 6.2, giving a marginal amount amount of bandwidth
to SP k increases both consumer surplus and total welfare.
This states that although from Proposition 6.2, adding this marginal bandwidth increases
xk and decreases x−k, the total quantity of customers served increases. Similarly, although the
revenue R−k decreases, the total welfare increases.
Suppose now that we wish to give the bandwidth to the SP which will increase consumer
surplus the most. That means allocating the bandwidth to maximize the total incremental
quantity customers served. In general, this depends on the derivative P ′(·) and second derivative
`′′(·), and is somewhat complicated (see Appendix 8.9); however, for linear latencies `k(x) = ckx,
it reduces to finding
arg max
k
−ckxk
B2k
(
P ′(x1 + x2)− 2c−k
B−k
)
(28)
Further constraining P (x) = 1 − ax, and using the best response conditions for xk, x−k, the
bandwidth should be given to agent k if
B−k >
√
c−k
ck
Bk +
2
a
(
√
ckc−k − c−k) (29)
Otherwise, it should be given to agent −k. Recall that when allocating additional intermittent
spectrum (α < 1), the consumer surplus is given by (14)-(15). Here we effectively have α = 0 so
that Ti = Bi +Wi, which replaces Bi in the preceding condition. When ck = c−k the condition
reduces to B−k > Bk, so that any marginal bandwidth should attempt to equalize the bandwidth
allocation. If ck < c−k, however, the allocation is biased towards SP k, which provides lower
latency.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a model for sharing intermittently available spectrum that captures licensed
and open access sharing modes, congestion as a function of offered load, and competitive pricing
for spectrum access. Our analysis suggests that allocating shared bandwidth as open access is
better for consumer surplus than licensing the bandwidth for exclusive use. While latencies
will be high, that is offset by lower prices, which has the effect of expanding the demand for
services. Allocating additional bandwidth as licensed is good for revenue, because SPs generally
choose to lower congestion by raising prices. The trade-off among revenue, consumer surplus,
and congestion depends greatly on the market structure. With many SPs, competition may
be enough so that total welfare (revenue plus consumer surplus) is maximized by licensing the
intermittent bandwidth. With asymmetric SPs having different amounts of bandwidth, it is
also possible that only a subset of the SPs use the open access band to maintain higher prices,
thereby containing congestion.
The model might be enhanced in several different ways. We have not directly accounted
for investment, which may be used to mitigate congestion, although we have shown that our
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main conclusions are robust with respect to a congestion penalty for open access. We have
also generally assumed that access to the shared band is free, and have not considered pricing
mechanisms, which could be used to allocate the shared spectrum as a combination of licensed
and open access. Those features might also be combined with an extended model that allows
SPs without proprietary spectrum to bid for open access spectrum, potentially combining both
price and quantity competition.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Bidding for shared spectrum: licensed versus open access
We consider the scenario in which two SPs can bid on the shared bandwidth W , and show that
they may prefer that W be allocated as open access rather than licensed. Assume that B1 = B2,
and that the incumbent of the shared band wishes to distribute W = 1. It can offer it as open
access or allocate it entirely to one of the providers. The table below records the revenue each
provider makes under each possibility.
α pre-allocation large small open access
0.1 0.08 0.096 0.052 0.063
0.5 0.08 0.102 0.057 0.068
0.9 0.08 0.11 0.064 0.075
23
The column labeled ‘pre-allocation’ lists the revenue of each SP before the allocation of addi-
tional bandwidth. The column labeled ‘large’ records the revenue of the SP that receives the
entire one unit of additional bandwidth. The column labeled ‘small’ is the revenue of the SP
who did not receive the additional bandwidth. The last column is the revenue of each SP when
the additional unit of bandwidth is offered as open access. Each row corresponds to various
levels of α.
Consider, for example, the case α = 0.5. Suppose the one unit of additional bandwidth is
allocated in its entirety via an ascending auction. If the current price is p, an SP should remain
active provided:
0.102− p ≥ 0.057 ⇒ p ≤ 0.045.
Hence, each SP should remain active until the price reaches 0.045. The winner will earn a profit
of 0.102 - 0.045 = 0.057. Notice, the profit of each SP is higher in the open access regime.
Hence, when paying for the additional bandwidth each SP would prefer open access sharing
over having the additional bandwidth as licensed to themselves.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1 follows in the standard way by deriving the reaction functions of each provider and
determining their intersection. Hence, many of the details are omitted. The revenue of provider
i, denoted Ri is:
pi
(
1− xi
(
1 +
1
Ti
)
− x−i
)
.
Compute ∂Ri/∂xi for each i and set to zero. The solution of this pair of first order conditions
is unique. The corresponding equilibrium quantities and prices for provider 1 are
x∗1 =
T1
T1
3T2+4
T2+2
+ 4T2+4T2+2
, p∗1 =
T1 + 1
T1
3T2+4
T2+2
+ 4T2+4T2+2
so that x∗1 =
T1
bT1+a
and p∗1 =
T1+1
bT1+a
where
b =
3T2 + 4
T2 + 2
= 3− 2
T2 + 2
∈ [2, 3), a = 4T2 + 4
T2 + 2
= 4− 4
T2 + 2
∈ [2, 4) (30)
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
To prove Theorem 3.2, recall that the revenue of provider 1 is given by R∗1 = p∗1x∗1 =
T1(T1+1)
(bT1+a)2
so that
∂R1
∂T1
=
(2T1 + 1)(bT1 + a)− 2bT1(T1 + 1)
(bT1 + a)3
=
(2a− b)T1 + a
(bT1 + a)3
∂2R1
∂T 21
=
(2a− b)(bT1 + a)− 3b
(
(2a− b)T1 + a
)
(bT1 + a)4
=
−2b(2a− b)T1 − 2a(2b− a)
(bT1 + a)4
,
where a and b are defined in (30). Using the expressions for a and b, we get
2a− b = 5− 6
T2 + 2
∈ [2, 5), 2b− a = 2.
Therefore, the revenue of provider 1 is strictly concave and increasing in T1 for any given value
of T2.
Both b and a are increasing in T2 and so it follows that R
∗
1 is decreasing in T2.
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8.4 Proof of Theorem 3.3
If an interior equilibrium exists, then:
pi = 1− xi(1 + 1Bi )− x−i − wi(1 +
(1−α)β
Bi
)− w−i
pwi = 1− xi(1 + 1−αBi )− x−i − wi(1 + αW +
(1−α)β
Bi
)− w−i(1 + αW )
Using this, the revenue of provider i is:
Ri = pixi + p
w
i wi
= (1− x−i − w−i)xi − xiwi(2 + (1−α)(1+β)Bi )− x
2
i (1 +
1
Bi
) + (1− x−i − w−i(1 + αW ))wi
− w2i (1 + αW + (1−α)βBi )
Assuming the revenue is jointly concave in (xi, wi) (which is true for β = 1 the case of interest),
the best response functions are obtained by setting the following (partial) derivatives to 0,
namely,
∂Ri
∂xi
= 1− x−i − w−i − wi(2 + (1−α)(1+β)Bi )− 2xi(1 + 1Bi )
∂Ri
∂wi
= 1− x−i − w−i(1 + αW )− xi(2 + (1−α)(1+β)Bi )− 2wi(1 + αW +
(1−α)β
Bi
).
In the symmetric case of B1 = B2 = B/2, we search for a symmetric equilibrium using the
above to get the following linear equations
x(3 + 4B ) + w(3 +
2(1−α)(1+β)
B ) = 1
x(3 + 2(1−α)(1+β)B ) + w(3 +
3α
W +
4(1−α)β
B ) = 1
Solving this yields the quantities in the theorem. The resulting prices are
p1 = p2 = 1− x(2 + 2B )− w(2 + 2(1−α)B )
pw1 = p
w
2 = 1− x(2 + 2(1−α)B )− w(2 + 2αW + 2(1−α)B )
From the equations of the equilibrium, it can be gleaned that the prices are positive. Thus, an
interior equilibrium exists.
8.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2.
For the analysis we assume that min
(
B + (1− β)W,βW ) > 0. The results for the equilibrium
quantities when this condition does not hold follow by continuity with the additional assumption
that B = 0 is necessarily accompanied with α = 1.
The revenue of SP i is
Ri =pixi + p
w
i wi
=
1− N∑
j=1
xj −
N∑
j=1
wj − αN xi
B + (1− β)W − (1− α)N
wi + xi
B
xi
+
1− N∑
j=1
xj −
N∑
j=1
wj − α
∑N
j=1wj
βW
− (1− α)Nwi + xi
B
wi
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Taking the derivative of Ri with respect to xi
∂Ri
∂xi
=
1− N∑
j=1
xj −
N∑
j=1
wj − αN xi
B + (1− β)W − (1− α)N
wi + xi
B

−
(
1 + αN
1
B + (1− β)W + (1− α)N
1
B
)
xi − (1 + (1− α)N
B
)wi
We will derive a symmetric equilibrium. It will follow from a subsequent theorem, Theorem 6.1,
that the unique equilibrium is symmetric. If we set xi = x and wi = w for all i, we get:
1 =
(
Nx+Nw + αN
x
B + (1− β)W + (1− α)N
x+ w
B
)
+
(
1 + αN
1
B + (1− β)W + (1− α)N
1
B
)
x+ (1 +
(1− α)N
B
)w
This implies
1 = x
(
1 +N + 2N
α
B + (1− β)W + 2N
(1− α)
B
)
+ w
(
1 +N + 2N
1− α
B
)
(31)
Taking derivative with respect to wi
∂Ri
∂wi
=−
(
1 +
(1− α)N
B
)
xi
+
1− N∑
j=1
xj −
N∑
j=1
wj − α
∑N
j=1wj
βW
− (1− α)Nwi + xi
B
− (1 + α
βW
+
(1− α)N
B
)
wi
Using an argument similar to that above we get
1 = x
(
1 +N + 2N
1− α
B
)
+ w
(
1 +
α
βW
+N +N
α
βW
+ 2N
1− α
B
)
(32)
Solving for the equilibrium using (31) and (32), we obtain
x¯(N) =
α(N+1)
βW(
1 +N + 2(1−α)NB
)(
2αN
B+(1−β)W +
α(N+1)
βW
)
+ 2αNB+(1−β)W
α(N+1)
βW
,
w¯(N) =
2αN
B+(1−β)W(
1 +N + 2(1−α)NB
)(
2αN
B+(1−β)W +
α(N+1)
βW
)
+ 2αNB+(1−β)W
α(N+1)
βW
.
Rearranging we get
Nx¯(N) =
B2 + (1− β)BW(
B 1+NN + 2(1− α)
) (
2βW NN+1 +B + (1− β)W
)
+ 2αB
, (33)
Nw¯(N) =
2βBW NN+1(
B 1+NN + 2(1− α)
) (
2βW NN+1 +B + (1− β)W
)
+ 2αB
. (34)
The results then follow in a straight-forward manner by taking the limit asN increases to infinity.
We also note that the congestion in the shared band is exactly 2NN+1 times the congestion in the
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proprietary bands.
8.5.1 Consumer Surplus
The total traffic carried ρ(N) is then
ρ(N) = Nx¯(N) +Nw¯(N)
=
B2 +
(
1 + βN−1N+1
)
BW(
B 1+NN + 2(1− α)
) (
2βW NN+1 +B + (1− β)W
)
+ 2αB
=
B
(
B +
(
1 + βN−1N+1
)
W
)
(
B + BN + 2(1− α)
) (
B +
(
1 + βN−1N+1
)
W
)
+ 2αB
,
which is of the form af(β)(a+b)f(β)+c where f(β) is an increasing function of β, and a, b, c > 0.
Therefore, it is immediate that ρ(N) is also an increasing function of β, and so is maximized at
β = 1.
Next we present the proof of Lemma 4.4, which studies consumer surplus with degraded
shared spectrum. When we allow the shared spectrum to get degraded, i.e., reduce by a factor
d, then we can use the formulae in (33) and (34) to analyze the equilibrium by setting the shared
bandwidth βW to dβW . Define d∗ = 2dNN+1 . Then the congestion in the shared band is still
2N
N+1
times the congestion in the proprietary band, i.e., denoting (x¯β(N), w¯β(N)) as the equilibrium
quantities have the following expressions:
Nx¯β(N) =
B2 + (1− β)BW(
B 1+NN + 2(1− α)
) (
2dβW NN+1 +B + (1− β)W
)
+ 2αB
,
Nw¯β(N) =
2dβBW NN+1(
B 1+NN + 2(1− α)
) (
2dβW NN+1 +B + (1− β)W
)
+ 2αB
,
⇔ Nw¯β(N)
dβW
=
2N
N + 1
Nx¯β(N)
B + (1− β)W ,
where we used the increased latency in the shared band for the comparison. Using this we have
the total traffic served ρβ(N) is then
ρβ(N) = Nx¯β(N) +Nw¯β(N)
=
B (B + (1 + β(d∗ − 1))W )(
B + BN + 2(1− α)
)
(B + (1 + β(d∗ − 1))W ) + 2αB ,
which is an increasing function of β if d∗ > 1 and a decreasing function of β if d∗ < 1. This
conclusion then directly implies that the consumer surplus is maximized at β = 1 if d∗ > 1 and
at β = 0 if d∗ < 1.
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8.5.2 Total Surplus
Assuming no degradation of the shared band the revenue of SP i is
Ri =
(
1−Nx¯(N)−Nw¯(N)− αN x¯(N)
B + (1− β)W − (1− α)N
w¯(N) + x¯(N)
B
)
x¯(N)
+
(
1−Nx¯(N)−Nw¯(N)− αNw¯(N)
βW
− (1− α)N w¯(N) + x¯(N)
B
)
w¯(N)
=
(
1− ρ(N)− αN x¯(N)
B + (1− β)W − (1− α)
ρ(N)
B
)
x¯(N)
+
(
1− ρ(N)− αNw¯(N)
βW
− (1− α)ρ(N)
B
)
w¯(N)
Hence, total revenue is
(1− ρ(N))ρ(N)− (1− α)
B
ρ2(N)− αN
2x¯(N)2
B + (1− β)W −
αN2w¯(N)2
βW
.
As consumer surplus is ρ(N)
2
2 it follows that total surplus is
ρ(N)− ρ(N)
2
2
− (1− α)
B
ρ2(N)− αN
2x¯(N)2
B + (1− β)W −
αN2w¯(N)2
βW
.
Plots for various parameter values suggest that social welfare is a convex function of β for
each N . If true, maximization over β is achieved at one of the endpoints, i.e., either 0 or 1. The
maximizer β∗(N) is initially 0, and it jumps to 1 and remains there for large enough N . Most
examples show this is between 2 and 3 (see Figure 4).
8.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Recall that the total traffic carried is given by
ρ := x∗ + w∗ =
B
(
B +W (1 + β)
)(
B + 2(1− α))(B +W (1 + β))+ 2Bα.
It is straightforward to verify that the total quantity carried, and hence, the consumer surplus
are both maximized at β = 1.
Now social welfare as a function of β denoted SW (β) is given by:
SW (β) =
(B +W +Wβ)2(B
2
2 +B(1− α)) +B2α(B +W −Wβ).
[(B +W +Wβ)(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα]2 .
The derivative of SW (β) with respect to β when set to zero has a unique solution, β∗. For
0 ≤ β < β∗ the derivative is negative, for β∗ < β ≤ 1, it is positive.9 Thus to find the maximum
value it is sufficient to compare the values at the two extremes. Now,
SW (0) =
(B +W )2(B
2
2 +B(1− α)) +B2α(B +W )
[(B +W )(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα]2
9 As SW (β) is the ratio of two affine functions with a positive denominator, it is quasi-convex.
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and
SW (1) =
(B + 2W )2(B
2
2 +B(1− α)) +B3α)
[(B + 2W )(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα]2 .
Now SW (0) > SW (1) implies
(B +W )2(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα(B +W )
[(B +W )(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα]2 >
(B + 2W )2(B + 2(1− α)) + 2B2α)
[(B + 2W )(B + 2(1− α)) + 2Bα]2 .
⇒ B + 2(1− α) +
2Bα
B+W
(B + 2(1− α) + 2BαB+W )2
>
B + 2(1− α) + 2B2α
(B+2W )2
(B + 2(1− α) + 2BαB+2W )2
⇒ (B + 2(1− α) + 2Bα
B + 2W
)2 > (B + 2(1− α) + 2Bα
B +W
)(B + 2(1− α) + 2B
2α
(B + 2W )2
)
If we let C = B+2(1−α)2Bα the expression above simplifies to
(C +
1
B + 2W
)2 > (C +
1
B +W
)(C +
B
(B + 2W )2
)
which is clearly true.
8.7 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We will assume that there are B > 0 units of always available spectrum and W > 0 units of
intermittent spectrum with availability α ∈ (0, 1]. We will also assume that there is one “big”
SP (labeled as 1) and N “small” ones (for N ≥ 1) with the ith small provider labeled as (2, i).
The allocation of resources is as specified below:
1. The big SP owns the license to B1 units of always available spectrum and W1 units of
intermittent spectrum;
2. Each of the small SPs owns the license to B2/N units of always available spectrum and
W2/N units of intermittent spectrum;
3. βW units of intermittent spectrum is available to use by all the involved providers (big
and small) as shared spectrum for β ∈ [0, 1].
We will insist that B1, B2 ≥ 0 with B1 + B2 = B, and also that W1,W2 ≥ 0 with W1 + W2 =
(1− β)W . However, for ease of analysis we will assume that B1, B2,W1,W2 > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
We will denote the amounts served by provider 1 as x1 in licensed spectrum and w1 in shared
spectrum. The corresponding quantities for the ith small provider are x2,i and w2,i, respectively.
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Then we have the following expressions for the revenue of the providers:
R1 =
1− x1 − N∑
j=1
x2,j − αx1
B1 +W1
− (1− α)(x1 + w1)
B1
− w1 −
N∑
j=1
w2,j
x1
+
1− x1 − N∑
j=1
x2,j −
α
(
w1 +
∑N
j=1w2,j
)
βW
− (1− α)(x1 + w1)
B1
− w1 −
n∑
j=1
w2,j
w1
R2,i =
1− x1 − N∑
j=1
x2,j − αNx2,i
B2 +W2
− (1− α)n(x2,i + w2,i)
B2
− w1 −
N∑
j=1
w2,j
x2,i
+
1− x1 − N∑
j=1
x2,j −
α
(
w1 +
∑N
j=1w2,j
)
βW
− (1− α)N(x2,i + w2,i)
B2
− w1 −
N∑
j=1
w2,j
w2,i
Taking partial derivatives, and then setting x2,i ≡ x2 and w2,i ≡ w2 (the response of all the
small SPs will be the same at equilibrium as can be argued from the symmetry of the potential
function) we get the partial derivatives in the quantities as
∂R1
∂x1
= 1− 2x1
(
1 +
α
B1 +W1
+
1− α
B1
)
− 2w1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
−Nx2 −Nw2
∂R1
∂w1
= 1− 2x1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
− 2w1
(
1 +
α
βW
+
1− α
B1
)
−Nx2 −Nw2
(
1 +
α
βW
)
∂R2,i
∂x2
= 1− x1 − w1 −Nx2
(
1 +
1
N
+
2α
B2 +W2
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
−Nw2
(
1 +
1
N
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
∂R2,i
∂w2
= 1− x1 − w1
(
1 +
α
βW
)
−Nx2
(
1 +
1
N
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
−Nw2
(
1 +
1
N
+
α
βW
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
The equilibrium quantities are the unique set of non-negative numbers (x1, w2, x2, w2) such at
∂R1
∂x1
≤ 0,∂R1
∂w1
≤ 0, ∂R2,i
∂x2
≤ 0,∂R2,i
∂w2
≤ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , N
∂R1
∂x1
x1 =
∂R1
∂w1
w1 = 0,
∂R2,i
∂x2
x2 =
∂R2,i
∂w2
w2 = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , N
Note that the inequalities give the set of the first-order conditions for maximizing the potential
function, and the equations the set of complementary slackness conditions for the non-negativity
constraints.
Next we will take the limit of N →∞ where we will identify the equilibrium quantities as x∗1,
w∗1, x∗2 and w∗2 with the understanding10 that limn→∞(x1, w1, Nx2, Nw2) = (x∗1, w∗1, x∗2, w∗2). We
will denote the limiting values of the derivatives by ∆xR1, ∆wR1, ∆xR2 and ∆wR2, respectively.
10From the uniqueness of the solutions that any limit point has to satisfy, it is easily verified that the limits exist:
existence of limit points holds from compactness and uniqueness of solutions using a potential function proves the
remainder.
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Then we have
∆xR1 = 1− 2x∗1
(
1 +
α
B1 +W1
+
1− α
B1
)
− 2w∗1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
− x∗2 − w∗2
∆wR1 = 1− 2x∗1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
− 2w∗1
(
1 +
α
βW
+
1− α
B1
)
− x∗2 − w∗2
(
1 +
α
βW
)
∆xR2 = 1− x∗1 − w∗1 − x∗2
(
1 +
2α
B2 +W2
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
− w∗2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
∆wR2 = 1− x∗1 − w∗1
(
1 +
α
βW
)
− x∗2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
− w∗2
(
1 +
α
βW
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
We will also have
∆xR1 ≤ 0,∆wR1 ≤ 0, ∆xR2 ≤ 0,∆wR2 ≤ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n
∆xR1x
∗
1 =∆wR1w
∗
1 = 0, ∆xR2x
∗
2 =∆wR2w
∗
2 = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n
Given the asymmetry between the SP 1 and the small ones, we will have to consider the
possibility of SP 1 not using the shared spectrum. Using the asymptotic equilibrium quantities
we will next provide11 an inequality for the parameters which when satisfied will imply the
existence of an N∗ such that for all N ≥ N∗, in equilibrium SP 1 will abandon the shared
spectrum. If the parameters are such that the inequality does not hold, then we will always
have an interior point equilibrium for any n but with the possibility that the limiting w∗1 is zero.
It is easily argued that x∗1, x∗2, w∗2 have to be positive.
The results can summarized as follows:
1. If the parameters are such that
B1 +W1 + 2(1− α)W1
B1
> 2(1− α)2βW +W2
B2
, (35)
then there exists an N∗ such that for all N ≥ N∗, SP 1 abandons the shared spectrum so
that the asymptotic equilibrium quantities are (x∗1, w∗1 = 0, x∗2, w∗2) where (x∗1, x∗2, w∗2) are
obtained as the solution to
1 = 2x∗1
(
1 +
α
B1 +W1
+
1− α
B1
)
+ x∗2 + w
∗
2
1 = x∗1 + x
∗
2
(
1 +
2α
B2 +W2
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
+ w∗2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
1 = x∗1 + x
∗
2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
+ w∗2
(
1 +
α
βW
+
2(1− α)
B2
) (36)
2. If, instead, we have
B1 +W1 + 2(1− α)W1
B1
≤ 2(1− α)2βW +W2
B2
, (37)
then for all N we have an interior point equilibrium so that the asymptotic equilibrium
11A full proof is omitted as the logic is exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
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quantities (x∗1, w∗1, x∗2, w∗2) solve
1 = 2x∗1
(
1 +
α
B1 +W1
+
1− α
B1
)
+ 2w∗1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
+ x∗2 + w
∗
2
1 = 2x∗1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
+ 2w∗1
(
1 +
α
βW
+
1− α
B1
)
+ x∗2 + w
∗
2
(
1 +
α
βW
)
1 = x∗1 + w
∗
1 + x
∗
2
(
1 +
2α
B2 +W2
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
+ w∗2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
1 = x∗1 + w
∗
1
(
1 +
α
βW
)
+ x∗2
(
1 +
2(1− α)
B2
)
+ w∗2
(
1 +
α
βW
+
2(1− α)
B2
)
(38)
Note that equality in (37) implies that w∗1 = 0 so that asymptotically SP 1 reduces the
quantity served in shared spectrum to 0.
Note that inequality in (37) resembles the condition from Theorem 3.4, but with a few terms on
the RHS omitted owing to many small providers assumption. It is easily verified at α = 1 that
the big SP always vacates the shared spectrum. It is also easily verified that at α = 1, the price
in the shared spectrum is 0 in the limit (LHS-RHS of the third equation in (36) is the price) so
that we get the same results as Bertrand competition.
Now consider the second scenario with asymmetric providers, and let xij and wij denote the
quantities in the proprietary and shared bands, respectively, for provider i in subset j. The
announced prices for provider i in subset j are
pij = 1−
2∑
j=1
∑
i
(xij + wij)− (1− α)xij + wij
Bj/nj
− α xij
(Bj +Wj)/nj
(39)
pwij = 1−
2∑
j=1
∑
i
(xij + wij)− α
∑2
j=1
∑
iwij
βW
− (1− α)xij + wij
Bj/nj
. (40)
and the corresponding revenue is Rij = pijxij + p
w
ijwij . In what follows we will drop the i
subscript since the equilibrium values will be the same within each subset of providers.
Evaluating the first-order conditions for best response and letting N →∞ gives(
1 +
2(1− α)
Bj
+
2α
Bj +Wj
)
x¯j +
(
1 +
2(1− α)
Bj
)
w¯j + x¯j¯ + w¯j¯ = 1 (41)(
1 +
2(1− α)
Bj
)
x¯j +
(
1 +
2(1− α)
Bj
+
α
βW
)
w¯1 + (1 +
α
βW
)w¯j¯ + x¯j¯ = 1 (42)
where x¯j = njxj , w¯j = njwj , j, j¯ ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= j¯. Note that xj and wj each tend to zero as
N →∞, but x¯j and w¯j converge to nonnegative constants.
The preceding conditions apply provided that x¯j and w¯j are nonnegative. Otherwise, the
providers in one of the subsets do not make use of the shared band, i.e., w¯i = 0 for some i. In
that scenario, we have ∂Ri/∂wi < 0 at wi = 0, which gives
x¯i
(
1 +
2(1− α)
Bi
)
+ x¯i¯ + w¯i¯
(
1 +
α
βW
)
> 1 (43)
where x¯j , j = 1, 2, and w¯i¯ are determined from the three conditions (41) with j = 1, 2 and
(42) with j = i¯. Combining (43) with the latter conditions gives the condition in Proposition
5.1. Note that the condition resembles (37) from above, but now with a few terms on the LHS
omitted owing to the many providers setting (the 2(1−α) term is then cancelled on both sides).
In contrast to the first scenario with one large SP, here the condition (43) can be satisfied for
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either a large (i = 1) or small (i = 2) SP.
8.8 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We show that under fairly general conditions the game with N providers has a unique Nash
equilibrium, and with some restrictions we also obtain a potential game. Assume there are N
firms and assume that prices can be negative; in equilibrium the prices will be non-negative.
We divide the proof up into several cases.
8.8.1 Linear inverse demand and latency
With linear inverse demand and linear latency, W0 units of intermitted secondary band set aside
for unlicensed access, and assuming that firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} has Bi units of always available
spectrum, Wi units of the intermittent secondary band, the utility of firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is
given by
ui(yi, wi,y−i,w−i) =
1− N∑
j=1
yj
 yi − (1− α) yi
Bi
yi − α yi − wi
Bi +Wi
(yi − wi)− α
∑N
j=1wj
W0
wi
= yi − y2i −
∑
j∈−i
yjyi − (1− α) y
2
i
Bi
− α(yi − wi)
2
Bi +Wi
− α w
2
i
W0
− α
∑
j∈−iwjwi
W0
Define the following function Φ(y,w) given by
Φ(y,w) =
N∑
i=1
yi −
N∑
i=1
y2i
(
1 +
1− α
Bi
)
−
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
yiyj − α
N∑
i=1
(yi − wi)2
Bi +Wi
− α
W0
N∑
i=1
w2i −
α
W0
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
wiwj
Then it is easily verified that
Φ(y1i , w
1
i ,y−i,w−i)− Φ(y2i , w2i ,y−i,w−i) = ui(y1i , w1i ,y−i,w−i)− ui(y2i , w2i ,y−i,w−i)
Therefore, we have a potential game. Furthermore, it is easily verified that Φ(y,w) is jointly
concave in y, w with the Hessian positive definite if α > 0. If the unique maximum (under our
convex and compact constraint set) also leads to non-negative prices, then it is the equilibrium.
In fact, one can impose non-negative prices as constraints on the actions, and then the resulting
unique maximum is a generalized equilibrium [9].
8.8.2 Linear inverse demand and convex latency
We can generalize the potential game characterization to the case where all providers have
proprietary latency functions that are convex and (strictly) increasing. However, we still have
to assume that the inverse demand function and the latency function in whitespace are both
linear. A fact that we will use is the following: l(x) convex and non-decreasing for x ≥ 0
implies that xl(x) is also convex, and l(x) being monotonically increasing implies that xl(x) is
strictly convex. Again assume that W0 units of the intermittent secondary band is set aside for
unlicensed access.
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The profit of firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is now given by
ui(yi, wi,y−i,w−i)
=
1− N∑
j=1
yj
 yi − (1− α)li(yi)yi − αli,w(yi − wi)(yi − wi)− α∑Nj=1wj
W0
wi
= yi − y2i −
∑
j∈−i
yjyi − (1− α)li(yi)yi − αli,w(yi − wi)(yi − wi)− α w
2
i
W0
− α
∑
j∈−iwjwi
W0
Then, the potential function Φ(y,w) is given by
Φ(y,w) =
N∑
i=1
yi −
N∑
i=1
y2i −
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
yiyj − (1− α)
N∑
i=1
li(yi)yi − α
N∑
i=1
li,w(yi − wi)(yi − wi)
− α
W0
N∑
i=1
w2i −
α
W0
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
wiwj
If the inverse demand function is P (y) = 1 − γy for some γ > 0, then, the potential function
Φ(y,w) is given by
Φ(y,w) =
N∑
i=1
yi − γ
N∑
i=1
y2i − γ
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
yiyj − (1− α)
N∑
i=1
li(yi)yi − α
N∑
i=1
li,w(yi − wi)(yi − wi)
− α
W0
N∑
i=1
w2i −
α
W0
N∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
wiwj
8.8.3 Concave inverse demand and convex latency
Finally, we consider the existence of pure equilibria in the general case where, the inverse demand
is a general concave decreasing function P (·) and the latency function in whitespace is a general
convex increasing function lw(·). Assuming the latency cost to be a function of the normalized
load12 incorporating the capacity provisioned is a special case of our general setting. In this
case the utility of firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is now given by
ui(yi, wi,y−i,w−i) = yiP
yi + ∑
j∈−i
yj
− (1− α)li(yi)yi
− αli,w(yi − wi)(yi − wi)− αwilw
wi + ∑
j∈−i
wj
 ,
where −i := {1, 2, . . . , N} \ {i}. It is easily verified that given the strategy of the opponents,
namely (y−i,w−i), the utility of firm i is jointly concave in (yi, wi), and where (y,w) are to be
chosen from a compact and convex set13.Therefore, we have a concave game and existence of
pure equilibria follows from the results of [9].
Following up regarding the uniqueness of equilibria, using [9] (taking ri ≡ 1 for all i =
12These correspond to the latency cost for proprietary spectrum of provider i being `i(x) = fi(x/Bi) for some Bi > 0
and `i,w(x) = fi(x/(Bi + Wi)) for some Wi ≥ 0 with fi(·) convex and increasing, and lw(w) = fw(w/W ) for some
W > 0 and fw(·) convex and increasing.
13The constraints are
∑
i yi ≤ 1, yi ≥ wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and the prices being non-negative.
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1, 2, . . . , N) and working with variables xi = yi−wi and wi, we need to determine the Jacobian G
of the gradient vector g and show that H = G+GT is negative definite, where for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
gxi =
∂ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi
= P (
N∑
j=1
xj + wj) + (xi + wi)P
′(
N∑
j=1
xj + wj)− (1− α)(li(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l′i(xi + wi))
− α(li,w(xi) + xil′i,w(xi))
gwi =
∂ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi
= P (
N∑
j=1
xj + wj) + (xi + wi)P
′(
N∑
j=1
xj + wj)− (1− α)(li(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l′i(xi + wi))
− α(lw(
N∑
j=1
wj) + wil
′
w(
N∑
j=1
wj))
where we use the original strategy space (xi, wi) for each of the providers and label each com-
ponent by the corresponding variable. Note that for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
Gxi,xj =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂xj
, Gxi,wj =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂wj
,
Gwi,xj =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂xj
, Gwi,wj =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂wj
and
Hxi,xj = Hxj ,xi =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂xj
+
∂2uj(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂xj
,
Hxi,wj = Hwj ,xi =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂wj
+
∂2uj(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂wj
Hwi,xj = Hxj ,wi =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂xj
+
∂2uj(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂xj
Hwi,wj = Hwj ,wi =
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂wj
+
∂2uj(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂wj
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We have the following for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂xi
= 2P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
− (1− α)(2l′i(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l′′i (xi + wi))
− α(2l′i,w(xi) + xil′′i,w(xi))
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂wi
= 2P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
− (1− α)(2l′i(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l′′i (xi + wi))
− α(2l′w(
N∑
k=1
wk) + wil
′′
w(
N∑
k=1
wk))
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂wi
= 2P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
− (1− α)(2l′i(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l′′i (xi + wi))
For i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} with i 6= j we have
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂xj
= P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂xi∂wj
= P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂xj
= P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
∂2ui(xi, wi,x−i,w−i)
∂wi∂wj
= P ′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk) + (xi + wi)P
′′(
N∑
k=1
xk + wk)
− α(l′w(
N∑
k=1
wk) + wil
′′
w(
N∑
k=1
wk))
Therefore, zTHz is given by
zTHz = 2P ′
(
(x+w)T1
) [
(zT1)2 + (zx + zw)
T (zx + zw)
]
+ 2P ′′
(
(x+w)T1
)
(zx + zw)
T1(x+w)T (zx + zw)
− α
N∑
i=1
(
2l′i,w(xi) + xil
′′
i,w(xi)
)
z2xi
− (1− α)
N∑
i=1
(
2l′i(xi + wi) + (xi + wi)l
′′
i (xi + wi)
)
(zxi + zwi)
2
− 2αl′w
(
wT1
) [
(zw
T1)2 + zw
T zw
]− 2αl′′w (wT1) zwT1wT zw
If either P ′(0) < 0 and l′w(0) > 0 or l′i(0) > 0 and l
′
i,w(0) > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , then it
follows that H is negative definite, where we’ve also used the fact that 1(x+w)T and 1wT are
positive semidefinite since x and w are non-negative vectors. Under these conditions we have a
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unique equilibrium. Note that P ′(0) < 0 and l′w(0) > 0 is a sufficient condition for xP (x) being
strictly concave and xlw(x) being strictly convex, and similarly, l
′
i(0) > 0 and l
′
i,w(0) > 0 for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , N is a sufficient condition for xli(x) and xli,w(x) being strictly convex for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The case of no shared spectrum is equivalent to α = 0 above with the understanding that
provider i only chooses yi = xi +wi. In that case (with dimension of H being N ×N) we have
zTHz = 2P ′
(
yT1
) [
(zT1)2 + zT z
]
+ 2P ′′
(
yT1
)
zT1yT z
−
N∑
i=1
(
2l′i(yi) + yil
′′
i (yi)
)
z2yi
If either P ′(0) < 0 or l′i(0) > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , then it follows that H is negative definite,
and we have a unique equilibrium.
Generalizations: The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibria also extends to more
general availability scenarios, with a similar proofs. For example, we can allow the proprietary
spectrum of different providers to also have a general distribution of availability with possibly
multiple bands with the only restriction being that every service provider always has a minimum
non-zero amount of spectrum available for proprietary use. Similarly, we can also allow multiple
shared bands and also the proprietary spectrum with a general distribution, with the restriction
that whenever the total amount of shared bandwidth is zero, there is non-zero proprietary
bandwidth available at every provider and every service provider always has a minimum non-
zero amount of spectrum available for proprietary use.
8.8.4 Structure
Theorem 6.1 gives us a unique equilibrium. It is easy to see that prices being 0 at equilibrium
can only occur if the quantity is also zero: if not, then reducing the quantity by  leads to non-
zero price and an increase in profit. The unique equilibrium also maximizes a concave potential
function when the demand function is linear and all the latencies are linear too. We use this and
the KKT theorem to characterize the structure of the equilibrium. We establish the following
results:
1. Considering the case of N = 2 in Result 1 we provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for a provider to not use the shared spectrum in equilibrium.
2. Again specializing to N = 2, in Result 2 we show that the proprietary spectrum bands are
always used in equilibrium. We also show that the logic extends to N > 2 also.
3. In Result 3 we provide the counterpoint to Result 1 to determine necessary and sufficient
conditions for both providers to use all available spectrum bands.
4. In Result 4 we generalize Result 1 to the case of N > 2 and provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for all but one provider to not use the shared spectrum in equilibrium.
5. In Result 5 we further generalize Results 1 through 4 to the case when some of the licensed
bands are also intermittent.
Result 1: The equilibrium is such that w∗i = 0, y
∗
i = x
∗
i > 0, and y
∗
−i > w
∗
−i > 0 if and only
if Bi ≥ 2W + 4(1− α) WB−i + 2B−i + 2, so that provider i does not use the whitespace spectrum
while provider −i gets proprietary access.
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Proof: Note that N = 2. Let i = 1 wlog so that −i = 2. Then we have
∂Φ
∂y1
= 1− 2y1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
− y2 − 2α
B1
(y1 − w1)
∂Φ
∂y2
= 1− 2y2
(
1 +
1− α
B2
)
− y1 − 2α
B2
(y2 − w2)
∂Φ
∂w1
= −2α
B1
(w1 − y1)− 2α
W
w1 − α
W
w2
∂Φ
∂w2
= −2α
B2
(w2 − y2)− 2α
W
w2 − α
W
w1
If the optimum (and also equilibrium) is such that w∗1 = 0, y∗1 = x∗1 > 0, and y∗2 > w∗2 > 0, then
∂Φ
∂y1
= 0, ∂Φ∂y2 = 0,
∂Φ
∂w2
= 0 and ∂Φ∂w1 ≤ 0 at the optimum. Substituting the variables and using
the above constraints, we get
0 = 1− 2y∗1
(
1 +
1− α
B1
)
− y∗2 −
2α
B1
y∗1
0 = 1− 2y∗2
(
1 +
1− α
B2
)
− y∗1 −
2α
B2
(y∗2 − w∗2)
0 = −2α
B2
(w∗2 − y∗2)−
2α
W
w∗2
0 ≥ 2α
B1
y∗1 −
α
W
w∗2
The third equation implies that
y∗2 =
(
1 +
B2
W
)
w∗2 > w
∗
2 (If w
∗
2 > 0)
Using this we get two equations in two unknowns, y∗1 and w∗2. Solving these yields
w∗2 =
1 + 2B1
(4(1 + 1B1 )(1 +
1
B2
)− 1)(1 + B2W )− 4αB2 (1 + 1B1 )
y∗1 =
1 + 2(1−α)B2 +
B2
W +
2
W
(4(1 + 1B1 )(1 +
1
B2
)− 1)(1 + B2W )− 4αB2 (1 + 1B1 )
Note that both are positive. With some algebra it is also verified that all the prices are non-
negative. Thus, the last condition that must hold is ∂Φ∂w1 ≤ 0, which implies that 2B1 y∗1 ≤ 1W w∗2,
i.e.,
B1 ≥ 2W + 4(1− α)W
B2
+ 2B2 + 2
Additionally, it can also be verified for all B1 satisfying the above inequality
B2 < 2W + 4(1− α)W
B1
+ 2B1 + 2
This proves the result. 2
Remarks:
1. The proof above holds by checking for conditions when the chosen equilibrium maximizes
the potential function; the condition is equivalent to the partial derivative of the potential
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function in wi being non-positive. For fixed B−i, W and α for all Bi sufficiently large,
the condition above will hold. Keeping Bi, W and α fixed such that Bi ≥ 2W + 2 +
4
√
2(1− α)W (RHS is minimum value of lower bound as B−i is varied), there are two
values Blb−i and B
ub
−i (corresponding to solution to quadratic with equality in constraint)
such that if B−i ∈ [Blb−i, Bub−i], then provider i vacates the share spectrum, and otherwise
she uses it; if Bi < W+2+4
√
2(1− α)W , then provider i always uses the shared spectrum.
2. From constrained optimization theory we know that at the equilibrium we will have ∂Φ∂w1 ≤ 0
and ∂Φ∂w2 ≤ 0. Rewriting these in terms of the equilibrium variables (and assuming α > 0)
we get
x∗i
Bi
≤ w
∗
i +
w∗−i
2
W
≤ w
∗
1 + w
∗
2
W
,
which is equivalent to stating that the congestion level in the proprietary bands is always
less than the congestion level in the shared band; note that if the provider i uses the shared
band, then the first inequality is tight. Additionally, if in equilibrium both providers carry
non-zero traffic in the shared band, then the congestion level in the shared band is strictly
greater, by exactly
w∗−i
2W for provider i ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore, if in equilibrium provider
i ∈ {1, 2} does not use the shared band, then the proprietary band for provider −i and
the shared band have the same congestion level that is at least two times the level of
the congestion in provider i’s proprietary band. Interestingly, this is the only reason for
provider i to not use the shared band, as opposed to others such as the (corresponding)
price becoming negative if the traffic carried is positive, etc.
Result 2: At the equilibrium x∗i > 0 for all i = 1, 2, irrespective of the parameters.
Proof: As before let i = 1 wlog so that −i = 2. If x∗1 = 0, then y∗1 = w∗1 > 0 (easy to see that
at least one of x∗1 or w∗1 should be positive). This then implies that
∂Φ
∂y1
≤ 0, and ∂Φ
∂w1
≥ 0.
The second inequality can be rewritten as
−2α
W
w∗1 −
α
W
w∗2 ≥ 0,
which then implies that w∗1 = w∗2 = 0. This is a contradiction. 2
Using the same logic, this result holds for N > 2 too. For the N = 2 case, we next show that
Result 2 implies Result 3.
Result 3: For N = 2, if the conditions of Result 1 don’t hold, then the equilibrium is always
an interior point equilibrium.
Proof: From Result 2 we know that x∗i > 0 for all i = 1, 2. Since the conditions of Result 1
don’t apply, we can either have w∗1 = w∗2 = 0 or w∗1, w∗2 > 0. The former cannot hold as this
would imply
∂Φ
∂wi
≤ 0⇔ 2α
Bi
x∗i ≤ 0⇔ x∗i = 0,
which is a contradiction. 2
Result 4: For general N , the equilibrium is y∗i = x
∗
i > 0, w
∗
i = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
and y∗N > w
∗
N > 0 if and only if Bi ≥ 2W + 2BN + 2 + 4(1 − α) WBN for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
Note that all providers except for provider N vacate the whitespace spectrum
Proof: Using the potential function and the KKT conditions for convex optimization, the
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equilibrium is y∗i = x
∗
i > 0, w
∗
i = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and y∗N > w∗N > 0 if and only if
the following hold at the equilibrium
∂Φ
∂yi
= 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N (44)
∂Φ
∂wi
≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 (45)
∂Φ
∂wN
= 0 (46)
Equation (46) yields
∂Φ
∂wN
= − 2α
BN
(wN − yN )− 2α
W
wN = 0⇔ y∗N =
(
1 +
BN
W
)
w∗N (47)
For i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, inequalities (45) yield
∂Φ
∂wi
=
2yi
Bi
− wN
W
≤ 0⇔ 2y
∗
i
Bi
≤ w
∗
N
W
(48)
For i = N , equation (44) in combination with (47) yields
∂Φ
∂yi
= 1− 2yN
(
1 +
1
BN
)
−
N−1∑
j=1
yj +
2αwN
BN
= 0
⇔
N−1∑
j=1
y∗j = 1− 2w∗N
[(
1 +
BN
W
)(
1 +
1
BN
)
− α
BN
] (49)
For i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, equations (44) in combination with (47) and (49) yield
∂Φ
∂yi
= 1−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj − 2yi
(
1 +
1
Bi
)
= 0
⇔y∗i
(
1 +
2
Bi
)
= w∗N
[(
1 +
BN
W
)(
1 +
2
BN
)
− 2α
BN
] (50)
Substituting the result of (50) into (49) yields
w∗N =
1
2
(
1 + BNW
)(
1 + 1BN
)
− 2αBN +
[(
1 + BNW
)(
1 + 2BN
)
− 2αBN
]∑N−1
j=1
1
1+ 2
Bj
> 0 (51)
With some algebra it can be shown that all the prices are all positive as well. Therefore, the
only conditions that need to be satisfied are given by (48), which simplify to
Bi ≥ 2W + 2BN + 2 + 4(1− α) W
BN
, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
This proves the result. 2
Result 5: Let the W units of secondary band be split into (W0,W1, . . . ,WN ) such that firm
i gets Wi units and W0 units are assigned to shared access, then the following are true:
1. For all N ≥ 2 the equilibrium is such that x∗i > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
2. The equilibrium is y∗i = x
∗
i > 0, w
∗
i = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and y∗N > w∗N > 0 if and
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only if for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
Bi +Wi + 2(1− α)Wi
Bi
≥ 2(W0 +WN ) + 2BN + 2 + 4(1− α)W0 +WN
BN
. (52)
3. For N = 2, if the condition in (52) is not satisfied for either firm 1 or 2, then we necessarily
have an interior point equilibrium, i.e., y∗1 > w∗1 > 0 and y∗2 > w∗2 > 0.
Proof: The proof follows by repeating all the steps of the proofs of Results 1 to 4, and is
omitted. 2
Remark: Similar to Remark 2 at the bottom of Result 1, at equilibrium we need ∂φ∂wi ≤ 0 and
this implies that for all i = 1, . . . , N
x∗i
Bi +Wi
≤ w
∗
i +
∑
j∈−i w
∗
j
2
W0
≤
∑N
j=1w
∗
j
W0
.
This again implies that conditioned on the intermittent spectrum being available, the congestion
in the proprietary band is less than the congestion in the shared band. Since w∗i > 0 implies
that the first inequality is tight, the congestion level in the proprietary band of provider i is
exactly lower by
∑
j∈−i w
∗
j
2W0
and strictly greater than half the congestion level in the shared band.
If instead, w∗i = 0, then the congestion level in the propriety band of provider i is less than half
the congestion level in the shared band. Both these statements hold when conditioned on the
intermittent spectrum being available.
8.9 Proof of Proposition 6.2
Given inverse demand P (·) and latency `(·), the revenue for provider k is
Rk = xk[P (x1 + x2)− `(xk/Bk)]. (53)
where Bk is provider k’s bandwidth. Setting ∂Rk/∂xk = 0 gives
P (x1 + x2)− `(xk/Bk) + xk[P ′(x1 + x2)− `′(xk/Bk)B−1k ] = 0 (54)
Taking ∂/∂Bk gives
∂xk
∂Bk
G(xk, x−k) = −2xk
B2k
`′(xk/Bk)− x
2
k
B3k
`′′(xk/Bk) (55)
where
G(xk, x−k) = 2P ′(x1 + x2) + xkP ′′(x1 + x2)− 2
Bk
`′(xk/Bk)− 1
B2k
`′′(xk/Bk), (56)
and is negative. The right-hand side is also negative, hence ∂xk/∂Bk > 0.
The best response condition (54) gives xk implicitly as a function of x−k. Swapping k and
−k, we can compute
∂x−k
∂xk
G(x−k, xk) = −P ′(x1 + x2)− x−kP ′′(x1 + x2) (57)
Since G < 0 and the right-hand side is positive, ∂x−k/∂xk < 0. Hence a marginal increase in
Bk leads to a marginal increase in xk and a marginal decrease in x−k.
Now let xk,−k = ∂xk/∂x−k and consider the sequence of best responses for n = 1, 2, · · · ,
which result from adding δBk starting from the equilibrium (x
(0)
k , x
(0)
−k):
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1. Update x
(1)
k = x
(0)
k + δx
(1)
k , where δx
(1)
k = (∂xk/∂Bk) · δBk > 0.
2. Update x
(n)
−k = x
(n−1)
−k + δx
(n)
−k where δx
(n)
−k = x−k,k · δx(n)k < 0.
3. Update x
(n+1)
k = x
(n)
k + δx
(n+1)
k where δx
(n+1)
−k = xk,−k · δx(n)−k > 0
4. Iterate steps 2 and 3.
The total change in xk is then the geometric series δxk(1+ρ+ρ
2 +· · · ) where ρ = xk,−kx−k,k.
Since 0 < ρ < 1, this sequence of best responses converges to a new equilibrium with quantities
(xk + δxk,eq, x−k + δx−k,eq) where
δxk,eq =
1
1− ρ · δx
(1)
k > 0 (58)
δx−k,eq = x−k,k · δxk,eq < 0. (59)
Furthermore, the change in total quantity
δxk,eq + δx−k,eq = (1 + x−k,k)
1
1− ρδx
(1)
k > 0 (60)
We must have ∂Rk/∂Bk > 0, since the revenue increases with Bk when xk is fixed, hence
optimizing xk can only increase the revenue further. The incremental revenue for agent −k is
given by
δR−k = x−kP ′(x1 + x2)(δxk,eq + δx−k,eq) + [P (x1 + x2)− `−k(x−k/B−k)]δx−k,eq
− x−k
B−k
`′−k(x−k/B−k)δx−k,eq (61)
where the first term (< 0) is due to the reduction in total price, the second term (< 0) is due
to the reduced quantity at the announced price, and the last term (> 0) is due to reduction in
latency. Combining with the best response condition (54), this simplifies to
δR−k = x−kP ′(x1 + x2) · δxk,eq < 0. (62)
8.10 Proof of Proposition 6.3
To prove Proposition 6.3, we note that the increase in consumer surplus follows directly from
(60). The increase in total welfare can be shown by adding the incremental areas when xk and
x−k are incremented by δxk,eq and δx−k,eq. (can add this later...)
To determine which agent should receive the bandwidth to generate the most consumer
surplus, we maximize the incremental quantity in (60). Equivalently, we wish to determine
arg max
k
(1 + x−k,k)
∂xk
∂Bk
(63)
Substituting for the derivatives, this becomes
arg max
(
P ′(x1 + p2)− 2
B−k
`′−k(x¯−k)−
1
B2−k
`′′−k(x¯−k)
)(
2xk
B2k
`2(x¯k) +
x2k
B3k
`′′k(x¯k)
)
(64)
where x¯k = xk/Bk. For linear latencies `k(x) = ckx this reduces to finding
arg max−ckxk
B2k
(
P ′(x1 + x2),−2c−k
B−k
)
(65)
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which this reduces to (28), and further constraining P (x) = 1− ax gives the condition (29).
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